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Abstract 
Public concerns about environmental problems create narrative structures that influence 
policy by allocating roles of blame, responsibility, and appropriate behavior. This paper 
presents an analysis of public concerns about transboundary haze resulting from forest fires 
in Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia for crises experienced in 1997, 2005 and 2013. The 
source of the information is content analysis of 2,231 articles from representative 
newspapers in each country. The study shows that newspaper reporting about haze has 
changed from a discussion of the potential health and economic impacts of fires resulting 
partly naturally from El Niño-induced droughts, towards an increasing vilification of 
Indonesia for not ratifying the 2002 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution; plus criticism of Singaporean and Malaysian 
companies investing in palm oil plantations, and ASEAN. Attention to climate change and 
potential biodiversity loss linked to haze, however, remains low. The paper argues that 
newspaper analysis of public concerns, despite political influences on the press, offers 
insights into how public criticism is voiced in these countries, and how perceived 
responsibility for action is changing. 
 
 









Transboundary haze caused by forest fires in Indonesia has affected air quality in 
neighboring Singapore and Malaysia for a number of years. While there are records of 
smoke and haze occurring before the 1990s, haze was noted to be a major problem in 1997 
when the cities of Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, and to a lesser extent Bangkok, Brunei and 
Jakarta, were affected by smoke for some weeks with widespread concerns about impacts 
on health and economies. In 2002, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
agreed to the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (ASEAN, 2002), which 
sought to implement measures to prevent the forest fires leading to haze. Indonesia, 
however, is the only member of ASEAN not to ratify this agreement. Haze continues to be a 
problem, with significant crises arising in 2005 and in 2013, where successively higher 
records of air pollution were measured in Malaysia and Singapore. 
 
This paper contributes to the political analysis of the haze problem by presenting a study of 
public concerns about haze in Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia based upon content 
analysis of key newspapers in each country for the crises of 1997, 2005 and 2013. By so 
doing, the paper serves two purposes. First, it presents a record of how public concerns have 
been reported, or have changed, at eight-year intervals since the first major haze crisis, as 
well as since the ASEAN Agreement. Second, this analysis offers insights into how public 
concerns create environmental narratives or storylines, which are “devices through which 
actors are positioned, and through which specific ideas of ‘blame’ and ‘responsibility’ and 
‘urgency’ and ‘responsible behavior’ are attributed” (Hajer, 1995, pp. 64-65). Narratives and 
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storylines are considered an important way to understand how different societies identify 
the causes and likely solutions to environmental problems, with implications for different 
political actors such as governments and citizens (Forsyth and Walker, 2008; Roe, 1994).  
Consequently, by analyzing public perceptions of blame and responsibility, it is possible to 
identify how the political agency attributed to ASEAN, individual governments, as well as 
non-state actors change over time, and how far public debate (as represented by 
newspapers) openly targets specific actors. 
 
To undertake this study, the paper adopts a methodology of comparative newspaper 
content analysis in order to indicate public concerns in each country in the different years of 
the survey. This methodology offers both strengths and weaknesses. On one hand, it 
presents a standardized comparative format over time and between different countries. 
Journalism is often described as “history’s first draft” and consequently forms an important 
reflection of, as well as influence on, public debate. Articles in newspapers also include 
readers’ letters and opinion pieces as well as straight news reporting. On the other hand, the 
countries involved also have varying levels of press censorship and control, and there are 
subtle differences in the language, reporting style, and cultural nuances in how news or 
public criticisms are reported in each country. This paper, however, presents this analysis as 
an important insight about public concerns, which can be complemented by additional 
information sources. 
 
The paper starts by summarizing the haze problem in Southeast Asia. It then details the 
methodology used, and presents information about public concerns about blame, risk, and 
potential solutions, as well as the perceived connections between haze and parallel 
environmental debates such as climate change, biodiversity and the cultivation of palm oil. 
Lessons are then drawn for how each country has perceived responsibility for action about 
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transboundary haze, and the respective roles of ASEAN agreement, national governments, 
and non-state actors. The paper also draws conclusions concerning the contribution of 
newspaper analysis for understanding public concerns. 
 
2. The Southeast Asia haze problem 
 
Haze occurs when smoke from forest fires and open burning combines with local air 
pollution over cities. Most burning has occurred on the Indonesian island of Sumatra 
(especially the provinces of Riau and Jambi), and on the island of Borneo, which comprises 
the Indonesian province of Kalimantan and the Malaysia provinces of Sabah and Sarawak. 
Smoke is carried by monsoonal winds most frequently to Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia and 
Singapore. The first occasion when transboundary haze was identified as a major problem 
was between July and October 1997, and were exacerbated by unusually long droughts 
connected to El Niño (Eaton and Radojovic, 2001). Haze, however, has returned in years 
unaffected by El Niño, most seriously in 2005, 2006, and 2013 (see Figure 1). In 2013 a new 
record for air pollution was set in Singapore when the local Air Pollution Index reached an 
all-time high of 401. 
 
Haze is problematic for four main reasons. First, it indicates significant forest fires, with an 
implied risk to biodiversity and release of greenhouse gases, especially from long-burning 
peat fires. Second, haze presents health hazard to citizens, especially young and old. Third, 
haze affects economic activity and tourism. Fourth, the transboundary nature of haze 
threatens diplomatic relations between neighboring countries (Glover et al., 2003; 
Narayanan, 2002). The Pollutant Standards Index (PSI) of Singapore measures five key air 
pollutants: sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, ozone, carbon monoxide and PM10, which is 
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particulate matter 10 microns or smaller in size. Malaysia uses the Air Pollution Index (API), 
which measures the same five pollutants but with different scales for calibrating pollutants.  
 
Various solutions have been proposed for haze. In immediate terms, haze can be mitigated 
by wearing facemasks, or by reducing the exposure faced by vulnerable people. Since 2005, 
the government of Singapore has published daily measurements of haze on websites. 
 
Longer-term solutions, however, require the avoidance of fires. Various analysts have 
proposed regulating and fining individuals starting fires (Chang and Rajan, 2001; Jones, 
2004). But it is usually difficult to identify actors responsible for fires. Many fires, for 
example, are blamed upon companies that seek to clear land cheaply in order to establish 
palm oil or rubber plantations: but these companies—perhaps predictably—are keen to 
assert their innocence and state that burning land does not suit their commercial interests. 
Traditional agriculture practiced by smallholders is another source of blame, but it is 
sometimes difficult to identify the differences between farmers acting for their own 
commercial interests, or hired to work on behalf of larger companies. Much popular 
discussion uses the words “slash and burn” to refer to the type of land clearance that uses 
fire indiscriminately, which sometimes confuses traditional land use based on historic 
shifting cultivation with uncontrolled burning to clear land for plantations. Indeed, research 
by Colfer (2000; 2005, p. 120) has indicated that companies can use fire as a way to compete 
for land concessions, or even use fire as aggressive acts to destroy competing plantations or 
to present other companies in a bad light. 
 
The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution was signed in 2002 and commits 
parties to international cooperation and domestic actions to prevent fires (ASEAN, 2002; 
Nguitragool, 2011a, b). Most members of ASEAN ratified this agreement in 2003. Indonesia, 
 7 
however, is the only party not to have ratified the agreement (Tay, 2009). Moreover, the 
agreement has been characterized as “shallow” because it “corresponds to the existing 
ASEAN institutional culture in terms of organizational minimalism” (Nguitragool, 2011b, 
p.148). ASEAN as an international grouping also represents a variety of compromises 
between countries that have immense differences as well as little history in seeking 
international agreements (Cotton, 1999). Implementation is also difficult because of close 
relationships between investing companies and local governments (Aggarwal and Chow, 
2010). In 2013, for example, the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission detained 
the governor of Riau province in Sumatra on suspicion of receiving corrupt payments from 
logging companies (Goh, 2013). Newspapers discussed allegations that Singaporean and 
Malaysian companies were most responsible for the deforestation and fires in Sumatra. 
Moreover, one of these Singaporean companies, Temasek Holdings, was particularly 
controversial because it is an official Government Linked Corporation (GLC), with strong 
investment and advisory links to the Singaporean government (see section 5) (Varkkey, 
2012, 2013). 
 
Haze is therefore difficult to control because it results from a complex set of climatic and 
monsoonal conditions; the rise of new export crops; and a set of challenging regulatory 
failures involving international, national, and subnational jurisdictions. An international 
agreement to address haze has apparently failed. This paper aims to contribute to new 
approaches to governing the haze problem by assessing public concerns about haze over 
time and in different countries. This study can help understand how different countries see 





3. The study and methods 
 
The study sought to identify how public concerns about transboundary haze had been 
expressed in newspapers in Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia since the start of the haze 
crisis in 1997. This information was then used to inform debates about the emergence of 
narratives haze (or the structuring of blame and responses in social discourse). It was hoped 
that these insights would then enhance understandings of public policy debates about 
different policy initiatives such as the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, 
or the connections between haze and concerns about climate change, biodiversity, forests, 
and palm oil. Newspapers have been used to study haze before (Massey, 2000; McLellan, 
2001), although this paper’s uses a more quantified technique. 
 
3.1 Selection of newspapers 
 
First, it was necessary to choose representative newspapers for analysis. Newspaper analysis 
in these countries, however, is challenging because of concerns about press censorship and 
the choice of printed language. One indicator of censorship is the Press Freedom Index, 
compiled by the journalistic organization, Reporters Without Borders. In 2013, Indonesia, 
Singapore, and Malaysia were ranked respectively as 139th, 149th and 145th in the world 
(where the maximum number of countries was 179 (Reporters without Borders, 2013). (The 
highest press freedom occurred in Finland, the Netherlands, and Norway). 
 
In Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia, there are various formal and informal practices that 
restrict newspaper criticism of governments, public figures (Atkins, 2001; Woodier, 2008). 
The 1988 Malaysian Broadcast Act allows ministers to determine subjects that can be 
reported on by newspapers (Eng, 1997, p. 441). In Singapore, the Newspaper and Printing 
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Presses Act of 1974 states that management shareholders have to be approved by the 
Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts. Many media outlets in Singapore are 
also owned by one company, Singapore Press Holdings. In recent years, there has been an 
increase in internet-based news and political discussion sites such as Singapore’s The Online 
Citizen or The Real Singapore. But in 2013, the Singapore government proposed new 
regulations and licenses for news websites, leading to a public protest by some 2,500 people 
(Ng, 2013). 
 
Despite these misgivings, the study assumed that newspapers still indicate public concerns 
in various ways. As this paper discusses (section 5) journalists apparently use language 
carefully to express criticism, or describe controversial subjects, without accusing anyone or 
becoming critics themselves. Newspapers also allow a form of criticism by printing readers’ 
letters and opinion pieces. Haze has never been a subject for press censorship in itself. But 
news reports could be seen to be critical of the government if they link haze to the activities 
of government-linked corporations in investments in Indonesia. This criticism would add 
weight to existing widespread dissatisfaction about alleged corruption and business 
connections within the Singapore and Malaysian governments (Varkkey, 2013).  
 
Newspapers also offer advantages for long-term analysis over social media websites because 
their archives exist for years. Moreover, local advisers from Malaysia and Singapore 
suggested that, at present, online news sites are less authoritative than newspapers because 
online articles can be easily withdrawn after publication, and many articles are anonymous. 
Online news sites also are relatively new: The Online Citizen in Singapore, for example, 
began in 2006, and therefore could not be used for comparison with 1997.  
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The three newspapers chosen were the Jakarta Post for Indonesia; Straits Times for 
Singapore; and the New Straits Times for Malaysia. These newspapers were selected with 
the help of local advisers because they are widely considered to be authoritative broadsheet 
publications that report on matters of public concern, and which have been published 
consistently throughout the period of the study. These are also English language 
newspapers, which allowed a relatively straightforward comparison (Indeed, Singapore uses 
English as its official media language). While it is clear that local language newspapers might 
present alternative visions of public concerns, it was decided that these leading national 
newspapers were likely to publish more authoritatively and widely on the subject of haze. It 
is also acknowledged that English-language newspapers in Southeast Asia are not targeted 
at foreigners alone, but at sections of their own populations who wish to read in English 
(Forsyth, 2007; Massey, 2000). 
 
The three newspapers are also independent of each other. The Straits Times (Singapore) and 
New Straits Times (Malaysia) were originally based on a newspaper launched in 1845, but 
became separate when tensions rose between Singapore and Malaysia in the 1950s. In 1957 
it was agreed that neither newspaper would be for sale in the other country or use the same 
articles. In 1965, when Malaysia split from Singapore, the Malaysian journal adopted the 
moniker “new.” The New Straits Times was chosen above the rival daily Malaysia 
newspaper, The Star, on the advice of Malaysian advisers who suggested that the New 
Straits Times was a non-tabloid style of newspaper that could be compared with The Straits 
Times and Jakarta Post. 
 
The Jakarta Post was established in 1983, and has since gained a reputation for giving 
publicity to debates about democratization (Tarrant, 2008). 
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3.2 Selection of news articles 
 
The next stage was to identify time periods of research. These were identified by conducting 
online searches for periods when haze was widely reported. The online-database, Factiva, is 
a widely-used database of international newspapers and was considered sufficient and 
reliable to access historic newspapers. Various words were used to identify when haze was 
reported most frequently. Words such as “haze,” “forest fires,” and “smog” were used 
initially to identify the search term. It was decided to use the word “haze” alone, as research 
showed it offered the maximum range of articles. It was, however, important to reject 
articles that used the term “haze” in irrelevant ways (for example, a popular Singaporean 
film was called Haze). The search also excluded reports from international news agencies 
such as Reuters or Associated Press in order to focus on local news sources. (Indeed, 
international news agencies tended to summarize local news for international audiences). 
The resulting articles used included a variety of news reports, letters, and opinion pieces. 
 
The results of this initial survey are shown in Figure 1. It was decided to base the survey on 
three periods: July-December 2007 (six months), August 2005 (one month), and June 2013 
(one month). The initial assessment for 1997 was longer than the subsequent years because 
the earlier period was when the “storyline” about haze was initially established, and because 
news reporting about this episode of haze continued for a much longer basis than in later 
years when reporting tended to peak within the period of just one month. The research 
therefore aimed to establish the baseline of public perceptions in 1997 when transboundary 
haze became a theme of significant public concern, and then assess how these perceptions 
had changed in 2005 and 2013, using just one month each for these later years. October 
2006 could have been chosen as an alternative to 2005, but it was decided that the selected 
periods offered convenient eight-year periods that allowed a measurement of how public 
 12 
perceptions changed over time. These decisions meant that the study was based on 1,659 
articles in 1997, 172 in 2005, and 400 in 2013 (or 2,231 in total). Table 1 lists the numbers of 
news articles used. 
 
 
Figure 1 around here “Frequency of news reports about haze, July 1997 – June 2013” 




3.3 Analysis of news articles 
 
The third stage was to analyze selected articles. This process adopted a standardized 
procedure for each newspaper, but there was also flexibility to acknowledge different 
means of expressing blame or criticism in different cultures. The nuances of public criticism, 
especially in countries where there are media controls, are discussed in section 5. 
 
News stories were analyzed in order to indicate underlying frames, or the underlying 
meaning and assumptions within stories, which indicate the significance attributed to haze 
at the time of reporting (Bauer, 2000; Pan and Kosicki, 1993). The method adopted 
borrowed strongly from an earlier analysis of environmental news in Thailand (Forsyth, 
2007), and a study of reporting about haze in Southeast Asia from 1997 (Massey, 2000). The 
point of frame analysis is to look beyond the immediate subject matter of an article (for 
example, the issuing of a statement by a government minister) and instead focus on the 
implied cause, blame, or responsibility (e.g. that Indonesia is acting irresponsibly). Each 
article was awarded a score for each frame it contained, allowing cumulative frames to be 
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compared between countries, and between different time periods. For example, a report 
about an NGO-worker criticizing Indonesia for failing to act over fires would result in a single 
score for blaming Indonesia, and a further score for civil society as a potential solution. 
Frames were counted each time they were identified, and then summed. This method was 
designed in order to measure frames as they were reported, and because most new reports 
were relatively short and contained only a few frames each. After summing, it became 
possible to rank the significance of different frames over longer time periods. 
 
Two sets of frames were observed. The first frames were concepts of blame, risk, and 
solution contained in each article. Many news reports or letters to newspapers sought to 
castigate the government of Indonesia, or the Malaysian and Singaporean governments for 
failing to regulate companies. Sometimes ASEAN itself was identified as a course of blame. 
Others identified a more specific role of companies, or smallholders practicing slash and 
burn agriculture. Other articles referred to the hazards posed by haze such as health risks, 
inconvenience to day-to-day lifestyles in Kuala Lumpur or Singapore (such as the 
cancellation of music or sporting events), or potential damage to economic growth and 
especially tourism. ‘Solutions” included short-term technological fixes such as facemasks; 
special measures for vulnerable social groups such as schoolchildren or elderly people; or 
diplomatic initiatives such as bilateral discussions, aid, or ASEAN initiatives.  
 
The second set of frames concerned themes not immediately related to blame, risk, and 
solutions, but were mentioned as relevant to haze. These frames included wider 
environmental problems such as climate change, biodiversity, and the governance of 
deforestation in general, or specific concerns such as the rise of palm oil cultivation. These 




To make the presentation of results clearer, the figures in this paper present information as 
a percentage of each set of frames relating to blame, risk, and potential solutions. The 
second set of frames is presented in terms of average frequency per news story because 
these were not always connected to a structure of blame, risk, or solutions. As this paper 
focuses on narratives of blame and responsibility for transboundary haze, most attention is 
given to the first set of frames. The second set of frames was also less frequent in news 
reporting, and so warranted less analysis. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Conceptions of blame 
 
The results for perceptions of blame and responsibility between the nation states of 
Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia are shown in Figure 2. Figure 3 shows the incidence of 
secondary blame categories of companies, smallholders and El Niño. These figures show 
some important changes in how blame has been allocated. 
 
In an earlier study of news reporting of haze in Malaysia (McLellan, 2001: 255), results 
suggested that the government of Malaysia was keen to maintain the country’s good image; 
avoid discouraging tourism; and maintain good relations with Indonesia and ASEAN as a 
whole. There was also a tendency to portray haze as a specific problem for East Malaysia 
(i.e. the provinces of Sabah and Sarawak) rather than peninsular Malaysia. The results of this 
current study supported, and added, to these initial findings. 
 
First, the proportion of all stories has shown a rapid increase in “blame” in all three 
countries since 1997. In 1997, the percentage of articles expressing making critical 
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statements or asserting direct responsibility for haze for Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia 
respectively were 28 percent, 25.9 percent, and 18.7 percent. By 2013, these had risen to 
64.3 percent, 31.4 percent, and 30.8 percent. These statistics show that the initial reporting 
of haze in 1997 more or less discussed blame, threats, and potential solutions in equal 
measure. By the 2000s, however, this distribution had shifted significantly towards 
identifying haze as an issue of failed responsibility. In all cases, Indonesia is clearly seen to be 
a subject for blame. Indeed, the Indonesian presidents Suharto and Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono issued formal apologies for the haze to their neighboring countries respectively 
in 1997 and 2013. 
 
 
Figure 2 around here “Where is blame allocated for haze?” 
Figure 3 around here “Other attributed causes of haze” 
 
But there are also other trends in the allocation of blame. First, national newspapers have, 
perhaps surprisingly, shown a willingness to blame their own governments. Hence, the 
Jakarta Post has overtly expressed the failures of its own government to address haze. The 
Singapore Straits Times, and Malaysian New Straits Times have also expressed concern that 
their own governments have not regulated their own companies that invest in Indonesian 
plantations. In Malaysia, the original reporting about haze in 1997 and 2005 even presented 
Malaysia as equally to blame (if not more so) than Indonesia (see Figure 2c). This trend was 
partly because haze was originally partly blamed on open burning of agricultural or 
municipal waste in Malaysian cities, but also because of a number of speeches by political 
leaders at this time sought to demonstrate diplomacy towards Indonesia by discussing 
mutual responsibility. In 1997, for example, the Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir 
Mohamad, was quoted as saying: “It is not Indonesia’s fault because we never informed 
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them that we need to work (together) on this particular case” (New Straits Times, 1997a). By 
2013, however, most notions of blame in the Malaysian newspaper were expressed against 
Indonesia. For example, a 2013 opinion piece in the New Straits Times urged, “it is caused by 
a neighbor who refuses to accept responsibility for it is a test of a patience that is not 
infinite” (New Straits Times, 2013a). Malaysia is also notable for blaming ASEAN (see section 
5). 
 
Besides the government of Indonesia, all newspapers identified companies as a key source 
of blame, and of failed regulation (see Figure 3). The proportion of blame allocated to 
companies, however, has declined between 1997 and 2013 as the proportion allocated to 
Indonesia, the country, has increased (with the exception of Singapore). Smallholders—or 
poorer agriculturalists living on the edge of forest margins—were also implicated in public 
discussions in newspapers, and especially in Malaysia (Figure 3c). Some journalists were 
keen to express that smallholders are not to blame (Stefanus, 2013). But more commonly, 
smallholders and companies were included in the same discussion of “slash-and-burn” land-
clearance methods, which can be used to indicate traditional land clearance as well as open 
burning by plantation workers. One common statistic, attributed to the Indonesian Minister 
of Agriculture, attributed 80 percent of forest fires to plantation owners (Jakarta Post, 
1997). 
 
Some blame for smallholders occurred when companies were interviewed in newspapers. In 
1997, for example, the Malaysian company, Tradewinds Plantations blamed burning on its 
Indonesian joint-venture partner or smallholders. A company representative said, “The 
problem of slash-and-burn which has caused the forest fires are mainly caused by the 
smallholders as they do not have the correct method to control the fire” (New Straits Times, 
1997b). In 2013, the Straits Times (Singapore) reported, “the Association of Plantation 
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Investors of Malaysia in Indonesia said Malaysian firms are not involved in clearing 
Indonesian land using fire. Its executive secretary [said}… “Plantation owners have to set 
aside 20 per cent of land to nurture smallholders in oil palm planting. It is a common 
practice for the smallholders to clear the land by fire” (Foo, 2013a). References to 
smallholders being to blame, therefore, seems to reflect quotations from other actors who 
might wish to blame them. Smallholders were not quoted blaming themselves. 
 
In addition, fires and haze were attributed to the effects of El Niño in all countries in 1997. 
This trend was especially marked in Indonesia, where El Niño was cited as a cause in 21 
percent of references to blame and responsibility in 1997. By 2013, however, there was only 
limited discussion of El Niño in Malaysia and Indonesia (Figure 3), possibly because 2005 and 
2013 were not notable El Niño years. 
 
It is also worth noting that some articles overtly proclaimed that no one country was to 
blame, or, most frequently, that Indonesia was blameless. In 2013, for example, the Jakarta 
Post featured articles arguing that Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono should 
not have apologized for the haze, on the grounds that the haze was caused because 
Singaporean and Malaysian companies were not regulated, and because Indonesian 
ministers themselves were critical of this apology (Jakarta Post, 2013). At times, the Jakarta 
Post has criticized Malaysia. For example, in 2005, an anonymous opinion piece stated: 
“Malaysian haze haters’ disappointment is understandable. They vent their anger 
…demanding that Indonesians stop choking them every single year …The Malaysian 
government’s offer to help to extinguish the forest fires is also understandable as their 
minister of forestry admitted that many Malaysian estate and wood companies operating in 
Indonesia were among the perpetrators of the fires (Jakarta Post, 2005).  
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In 2013, the Indonesian minister coordinating the haze response stated that the fires and 
haze were natural phenomena and not related to poor land management or lack of 
regulation, saying: “Singapore should not be behaving like a child and making all this noise. 
This is not what the Indonesian nation wants, it is because of nature” (Chua, 2013). 
 
4.2 Conceptions of risk 
 
Figure 4 shows the top three risks arising from haze for each of the three countries in 1997, 
2005 and 2013. The most consistent risks were, unsurprisingly, health, economy, and 
lifestyle. There was also concern that haze would bring additional risks to nature (or 
environment in general); diplomatic relations between countries; and the risk that reporting 
on haze would give a false impression to other countries. For example, in 1997, the Straits 
Times (Singapore) reported that a British news team had asked a tourist to pose for 
photographs wearing a gas mask beside a swimming pool. The newspaper stated: “This 
image would have seemed comical if it were not so damaging in its inaccuracy and 
dishonesty” (Straits Times, 1997a). McLellan’s study (2001: 262) also suggests that the 
Malaysian government engaged in a campaign of coordinated “denial” particularly targeted 
the British, United-States, and Australian media for alleged misrepresentation of haze in 
1997 and 2000. This current study, however, showed that newspapers did not report any 
attacks on foreign media in 2005 and 2013. 
 
Some of the largest fears about haze were that it would cause a fall in tourism, or in 
industrial investment and production. In 1997, government statistics estimated that haze 
cost the Singaporean economy of between US$9-10 billion, with an additional US$1.5 million 
for assisting with fire fighting in Sumatra (Straits Times, 1997b). In Malaysia, however, the 
main threat after health was identified as lifestyle, referring to the problems of day-to-day 
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life during haze. These articles would represent haze as a hazard to weekend sporting 
events, open-air concerts, or as opportunities to cook special meals. Indeed, there was 
evidence of some commercial actors trying to make light of haze. For example, the food 
chain, McDonald’s apologized in June 2013 for jokingly issuing adverts relabeling Singapore’s 
Pollution Standards Index as the “Peak Sauce Index:” (Straits Times, 2013a). 
 
A relatively less important risk was the threat to international relations between countries 
receiving haze and Indonesia. This was noted especially in Singapore, where it received 4.3 
percent of reports about potential threats from haze in 2005. 
 
Figure 4 around here “Perceived threats posed by haze” 
 
The impact on “environment” was difficult to assess. In one sense, all impacts reported were 
environmental. But only a relatively few newspaper articles discussed haze in terms of its 
impacts on ecosystems or as a symptom of widespread environmental degradation. In 
Indonesia and Singapore, newspapers referred to the perceived risk to “nature” prominently 
in 2005 and 2013. Many articles, however, referred to the impacts on forests, or the areas of 
land affected by fires, without discussing these impacts as a function of ecology or 
environmentalism. One Jakarta Post story referred to fires as a “wild cancer” taking its toll 
on forests (Sufa, 2005). The relative prominence given to “nature” in the Jakarta Post was 
probably connected to the willingness of this newspaper to interview representatives of 
environmental non-governmental organizations, which in turn influenced the significance of 
civil society as a potential solution (section 4.3). It is also worth noting that this apparent 
reluctance to interview environmental NGOs might contribute to the relatively higher rating 
of press freedom for Indonesia than Singapore and Malaysia (section 3.1). 
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But despite the relatively higher environmental focus in the Jakarta Post, the attention given 
to broader environmental problems was generally slim. Perhaps surprisingly, the 
relationship of haze to climate change—such as through the release of greenhouse gases or 
the long-term implications of peat fires—was rarely mentioned. In Indonesia, the references 
to climate change per story changed from 0.02 in 1997, to 0 in 2005, and 0.09 in 2013. In 
Singapore, these figures were 0.01, 0.04 and 0.02; in Malaysia, references remained at 0.01 
per story in all years. These figures might be surprising given the proximity of the initial haze 
crisis in 1997 to the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol, or because of the campaigning of 
international environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace and World Wildlife Fund. (These 
figures are mentioned per story because there was no overall framing of blame, risks or 
solutions attributed to these wider environmental problems). 
 
Similarly, references to biodiversity—as a subject in its own right—were also slim. In 
Indonesia, references to biodiversity were only explicitly made in 1997 (0.03 per story). In 
Singapore, the references were 0.01 (1997), 0.04 (2005), and 0.01 (2013). In Malaysia, these 
were: 0.01 (1997), 0.02 (2005) and 0 (2013). 
 
4.3 Potential solutions 
 
Figure 5 shows the potential solutions to haze that were discussed in the newspapers. The 
figure shows the top three solutions per year (or four solutions if there were similar scores 
for four). The proposed solutions were divided into different categories of short-term 
technological assistance (such as facemasks or cloud seeding); regulation of companies or 
smallholder behavior by governments; diplomacy (including bilateral agreements and aid); 
negotiations through ASEAN (which were identified separately to bilateral agreements); 
targeting of assistance to specific, vulnerable populations such as schoolchildren or the 
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elderly; and greater involvement of civil society and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). These results are ranked according to what was reported in newspapers, rather 
than in terms of which solution might be most appropriate or feasible. 
 
Figure 5 around here “Perceived potential solutions to haze” 
 
The most consistently discussed solution to haze was technology. The most common aspect 
was issuing facemasks as a short-term solution to living with haze. Next to this, the use of 
cloud seeding, or planes to drop water on fires, was widely discussed as action by the 
government to help alleviate the problem. The next most common proposed solution was 
regulation and enforcement of laws by governments, either in Indonesia or in Malaysia and 
Singapore for companies investing in land clearance. A third common proposal was the use 
of diplomacy or negotiations between one country and Indonesia in order to assist in 
addressing fires. Malaysia and Singapore both offered the use of planes and financial 
assistance. These potential solutions were prominent for all three countries, and for the 
range of dates from 1997 to 2013. 
 
There were, however, some differences to this trend. First, there were noticeable changes in 
the proposal of civil society and NGOs as a potential solution to governing haze. In 
Indonesia, civil society was proposed as a potential solution in 12.5 percent of articles in 
1997, rising significantly to 33 percent in 2005. (At this time, 31 percent of the Jakarta Post’s 
discussion of “blame” was critical of the Indonesian government). The role of civil society as 
a potential solution, however, fell to just 4.2 percent in 2013. 
 
In Malaysia, this trend was echoed less strongly, which saw the proportion of articles 
proposing civil society as a solution in 1997 of 4.6 percent; rising to 8.5 percent in 2005; but 
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falling back to 4.8 percent in 2013. In Singapore, references to civil society grew steadily, but 
unspectacularly from 3.3 percent (1997) to 7.1 percent (2005) and 8.4 percent (2013). Some 
of the topics discussed under civil society included the work of Greenpeace in identifying fire 
hot spots in Sumatra; citizen signing petitions to seek action; or the statement from some 
companies that solutions can only be achieved by motivating all stakeholders, including 
citizens and local groups (New Straits Times, 2013b). 
 
A further trend was the increased reference to ASEAN as a potential solution, rather than 
bilateral diplomacy. In 2005, both Indonesia (16.7 percent) and Singapore (14.3 percent) 
referred to ASEAN, and in Malaysia, this figure has increased steadily from 7.1 percent 
(1997), to 13.6 percent (2005), and 21 percent (2013). The role of ASEAN is discussed more 
in section 5. 
 
5. Discussion and implications for models of governance 
 
The narrative that emerges from news reporting about haze in Indonesia, Singapore and 
Malaysia is that the initial crisis in 1997 was perceived to be a result of poor forest 
management and El Niño. Discussions between countries led to the signing of the 2002 
ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution. But repeated crises, particularly in 
2005 and 2013, have been interpreted in terms of a failure by Indonesia to ratify and 
implement the Agreement, plus a new challenge by the governments of Singapore and 
Malaysia to regulate their own companies. Indeed, independent academic commentators 
also note this trend, with one writing: “Malaysian investors have been able to burn with 
impunity… because of the close patronage relationships and vested interests of the 
Malaysian government elites in these companies. Because of this, the home government is 




In the short term, governments are happy to represent progress through the allocation of 
facemasks, or to offer funds or aircraft to undertake cloud seeding. More generally, 
however, public debate has shifted from worry about the existence of the problem and its 
potential impacts on health and economy, towards an appreciation that a more complex 
solution is needed. These findings suggest that news reporting has become slightly more 
critical and confrontational since the analysis of reporting about haze in 1997 by Massey 
(2000) or McLellan (2000).  There are also some implications for models of environmental 
governance. 
 
One theme is a transition from reporting haze as simply uncontrolled burning in Indonesia 
creating problems of health and economy. It is now more critical of Indonesia, the role of 
specific investors, and the markets that connect investors and consumers of products. For 
example, attention to palm oil as a plantation commodity linked to haze has increased 
rapidly (see Figure 6). In Indonesia, there was no reference to palm oil in 1997 or 2005, but 
in 2013 this had risen to 0.26 references per story. (Rubber, by contrast, was only mentioned 
in a total of three stories in 1997 alone). News reporting in Singapore and Malaysia showed 
smaller, but still significant, increases in references to palm oil. 
 
This change in reporting reflects the fact that between 1995 and 2005, land used for palm oil 
production in Indonesia and Malaysia doubled to ten million hectares (Pye and 
Bhattacharya, 2013, p. 2). It also indicates a change in the discussion of haze to focus upon 
specific causes and political and economic challenges. One senior writer in the Straits Times 
(Singapore), wrote in 2013: “None of the regional palm oil producers is owning up to causing 
the still-raging Sumatra forest fires, and the recent nosebleed air pollutant levels can recur 
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any time. Widespread corruption on the ground means no new probes or regulations by 
Indonesia will have any effect, so all that is left is for weary consumers to boycott palm oil 
products” (Oon, 2013). 
 
In turn, this style of reporting indicates a greater willingness to criticize governments for 
corruption, and less focus upon reporting that has emphasized short-term technological 
fixes such as wearing facemasks. It also coincides with the greater trend towards criticizing 
Singaporean and Malaysian companies for their alleged role in haze (see Figure 3). 
 
Yet, the engagement of news media is mixed, and the style of criticism can be implicit rather 
than explicit. There is evidence, for example, that reporting in the selected newspapers has 
been less critical than alternative social media. Some Singapore-based websites such as The 
Online Citizen or The Real Singapore comprise opinion pieces and political analyses that are 
frequently critical of the Singaporean government, but lack the authority of national 
newspapers because authors are sometimes anonymous. During the haze crisis of 2013, 
these websites published information about the Singaporean company, Temasek Holdings, 
which includes investments in Indonesian plantations among its portfolio (Schaeffer, 2013). 
Temasek is also an official Government Linked Corporation (GLC) in Singapore. GLCs are 
official channels for state-led investment, and contribute up to 60 percent on Singapore’s 
Gross Domestic Product. In 2013, Ho Ching, the wife of Singapore premier, Lee Hsien Loong 
was the Chief Executive Officer, and some four of the ten members of the board of directors 
had held positions in government. The Online Citizen alleged that the company was engaged 
in producing a different kind of “haze” of positive news about the company in newspapers, 
in stark difference to the haze in the air (Leon, 2013). 
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The Straits Times newspaper, however, published articles that discussed the criticisms of 
Singaporean companies, rather than engaging in criticism itself. Moreover, during the 2013 
haze crisis, the newspaper published an interview with a representative of Temasek 
Holdings entitled, “No fires on land co-owned by Temasek” and with a statement that the 
company abided by rules of good corporate governance and local laws (Foo, 2013b). 
 
Figure 6 around here “Perceived connections between palm oil cultivation and haze” 
Figure 7 around here “ASEAN as a perceived solution, with Malaysia’s growing perception 
of ASEAN as part of the problem” 
 
This style of reporting could be what Massey (2000: 87) described before as “newspapers 
converged on seemingly non-confrontational frames, while downplaying the potentially 
troublesome ones, as a result of the influence of the ASEAN core value of maintaining 
cordial relations between member states.” Massey (2000: 87) adds: “being sensitive to 
neighboring nations is one occupational norm that distinguishes Asian journalism from 
Western forms of news reporting, which can be noticeably blame-oriented and, arguably, at 
times divisive.” But there is also evidence that newspapers are increasingly critical of this 
stereotypical ASEAN form of negotiation. This new critical insight is shown in the public 
criticism of ASEAN, and in the style of reporting despite media controls. 
 
Figure 7 shows the number of frames in the selected newspapers that were either critical or 
blaming of ASEAN. This figure shows that newspapers are increasingly referring to ASEAN as 
a potential solution to transboundary haze. 
 
But Figure 7 also shows that Indonesia and Singapore’s optimism for ASEAN declined after 
2005, which was shortly after the 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution. 
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Malaysia’s New Straits Times, on the other hand, demonstrated a growing debate about the 
pros and cons of ASEAN. On one hand, its newspaper reporting in general expressed 
increasing levels of optimism about ASEAN between 1997 and 2013. But at the same time, 
the New Straits Times has also increasingly featured letters and opinion pieces that have 
overtly blamed ASEAN for lacking progress, especially as the ASEAN secretariat is in Jakarta, 
where it could have influence on Indonesia (New Straits Times, 2013c). 
 
The Singapore Straits Times and Indonesian Jakarta Post did not repeat this criticism of the 
ASEAN agreement, but the Straits Times did express concerns about the ASEAN style of 
negotiation. In 1997, the Straits Times  seemed to confirm the non-confrontational style. It 
wrote, “The ASEAN way is a product of years of socializing among the member states… It is 
based on cooperation and consensus where informality, courtesy and politeness are the 
order of the day. Foreign policy is not conducted in full public view, risking public loss of 
face, and if a dispute cannot be resolved, it is left for another day (Hon, 1997). But by 2005 it 
published an article stating: “ASEAN’s penchant of favoring camaraderie over formality and 
process over substance, is well known …it just won’t work” (Gani, 2005). This article quoted 
an academic from the National University of Singapore, rather than expressing this concern 
in its own voice. 
 
The Malaysia New Straits Times has also echoed this trend. In 1997 it stated, “The ASEAN 
way is characterized by vagueness and longwinded indirectness. Obfuscation is often the 
result, and sometimes even the objective” (Ahmad, 1997). This statement is echoed by the 
observation of the Malaysian Sunday Times in 1997 (in McLellan, 2001: 257) that, “the 
‘ASEAN’ way of holding discreet behind-the-scenes discussions, while keeping the ASEAN 
public in the dark, may work in sorting out political, trade or diplomatic kinks. But it does not 
work when it comes to a disaster like the haze” (Sunday Times, 1997). 
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By 2005, the Malaysia New Straits Times continued this criticism: “The ASEAN transboundary 
haze protocol remains unratified by Indonesia, but in itself only calls for the sharing of data; 
an instance, perhaps, of fiddling while Rome burns” (New Straits Times, 2005). And in 2013, 
“We have been using all diplomatic channels to solve this problem the ASEAN way, but have 
we been successful?” (New Straits Times, 2013d). 
 
Evidence therefore suggests that public opinion about haze is becoming more critical of both 
national governments and the international models of dispute resolution adopted by ASEAN. 
In addition, criticism has become focused on government-linked corporations and especially 
the alleged role of Singaporean and Malaysian companies in open burning. At the same 
time, newspapers are able to voice these criticisms (despite controls on media) by reporting 
the words of critics, or simply describing debates about controversial matters, even if the 
newspapers themselves do not own this criticism themselves.  
 
Much reporting about haze still remains focused on short-term concerns such as the 
disruption to life, or the availability of facemasks. But there is a growing trend to question 
the model of governance that assumes a national government will implement solutions, and 
instead to look at the lack of regulation of companies who invest in plantations, and the 





Public concerns about environmental problems are important because they indicate how 
environmental changes are experienced as problematic, and because they offer insights into 
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the political processes that shape policy interventions. Social scientists have called these 
connections between public concerns and policy challenges, “environmental narratives” 
because they structure concepts of blame, risk, and potential solution. 
 
Understanding public concerns, however, is challenging because they can only become 
apparent through the use of indicators. Newspaper articles are a familiar source of 
information, but these might be inappropriate indicators of public perceptions because of 
censorship or political influence. The print media in Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia are 
widely considered to be subject to political control. 
 
Nonetheless, this study of public concerns about transboundary haze has revealed 
information about the public debate about haze, and about the journalistic representation 
of this controversy. The research presented in this paper demonstrates that newspaper 
articles—including news reports, letters, and opinion pieces—have gradually changed from 
simply describing the feared health and economic impacts of forest fires occurring during a 
prolonged El Niño period, towards being represented in frames of policy failure by 
Indonesia; the capacity of ASEAN to act; and the unwillingness or inability of Singapore and 
Malaysia to regulate state-linked companies. 
 
News reporting also indicates that most reporting of the day-to-day effects of haze in 
recipient countries still focuses on the impacts on lifestyle and short-term solutions such as 
issuing facemasks or chartering planes for cloud seeding. Beneath this discussion, however, 
is a growing trend to state that the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution is 
not good enough; that state-linked companies might be connected to the problems of land 
clearance for palm oil production; and an openly critical, not very-ASEAN way, of criticizing 
Indonesia for failing to ratify the ASEAN agreement. Indeed, newspaper articles are 
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increasingly questioning the stereotypical ASEAN non-confrontational model of negotiation 
between nation states, and seeking to emphasize criticism of companies, and the potential 
role of citizens. 
 
These findings suggest that newspaper analysis has an important value alongside other 
indicators of public concerns. Despite the political influences on newspapers in Southeast 
Asia, there is evidence that the public is increasingly critical of current policy approaches to 
haze. Citizens are also seeking more complex forms of governance that replace international 
commitments with a more confrontational and public criticism of companies investing in 
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Table 1: Numbers of news articles analyzed     Total number of stories about haze, July 1997-June 2013 Sample period 1: July-December 1997 
Sample period 2: August 2005 
Sample period 3: June 2013 
Jakarta Post (Indonesia)  901 213 17 34 
Straits Times (Singapore)  2082 491 25 271 
New Straits Times (Malaysia)   2406 955 130 95  Source: Factiva analysis     
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Figure 2: Where is blame allocated for haze? 










FIGURE 2A: WHO DOES INDONESIA BLAME? 















FIGURE 2B: WHO DOES SINGAPORE BLAME? 












FIGURE 2C: WHO DOES MALAYSIA BLAME? 








Figure 3: Other attributed causes of haze 
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FIGURE 3B: SINGAPORE: SECONDARY BLAME 
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FIGURE 3C: MALAYSIA: SECONDARY BLAME 
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Figure 4: Perceived threats posed by haze 



















FIGURE 4A: INDONESIA: WHAT DOES HAZE THREATEN? 





















FIGURE 4B: SINGAPORE: WHAT DOES HAZE THREATEN? 



















FIGURE 4C: MALAYSIA: WHAT DOES HAZE THREATEN? 
(Percent of all references to risks) 
    





Figure 5: Perceived potential solutions to haze 
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FIGURE 5A: INDONESIA: WHAT ARE THE SOLUTIONS TO 
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FIGURE 5B: SINGAPORE: WHAT ARE THE SOLUTIONS TO 
HAZE? 



















FIGURE 5C: MALAYSIA: WHAT ARE THE SOLUTIONS TO 
HAZE? 
(Percent of all references to solutions) 
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Figure 6: Perceived connections between palm oil cultivation and haze 









FIGURE 6: IS PALM OIL CONNECTED TO HAZE? 







Figure 7: ASEAN as a perceived solution, with Malaysia’s growing perception 
of ASEAN as part of the problem 
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